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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1961
the defendant's argument that there was no basis for the "necessity"
exception where the marriage occurred after the date of the offense.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion,30 concurred
with the majority's reasoning but disagreed with their conclusions.
He felt that there was no congressional support for the Court's deci-
sion, and that without it this decision represented an intrusion into
what was essentially a legislative area. He states: "It is more prop-
erly Congress' business, not ours, to place comparative values upon
the quest for facts in the judicial process as against the safe-guard-
ing of the marriage relationship .... -31 The dissent also pointed out
that under section 132832 the testimony of the spouse is made ad-
missible and competent, but not compulsory.
33
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives to
the federal courts the right to interpret the common law in the light
of "reason and experience." In the instant case, the Court did
exactly that. Finding little or no authority in either the common
law or congressional acts, the Court exercised its power in a very
limited area to reach a just and logical result. It is difficult to
conceive of a more vicious offense than that of inducing a woman
to prostitute herself for the benefit of another, and the crime takes
on an added repugnancy when the female is the wrong-doer's wife.
On the grounds of public policy and morality the decision in the
Wyatt case should receive approval as an effective method of cur-
tailing these offenses.
George M. McClure III.
QUO WARRANTO
The unsuccessful candidates for offices in an unincorporated
labor union local asked the district attorney to bring an action
under the Rule of Civil Procedure' which abolishes the ancient writ
of quo warranto and allows a civil action against officers allegedly
elected through use of unfair election procedures and in violation of
the organization's constitution. When the district attorney refused
the unsuccessful candidates brought their own action as permitted
by the rule. Held: Judgment for defendants affirmed. The action
was not properly brought because quo warranto applies only to
public, not private, offices. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 357
P. 2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
Quo warranto is traditionally viewed as a proceeding to test
a party's right to a public office or franchise.2 It is an extraordinary
and highly prerogative writ,3 warranted only when a wrong against
30 With whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joined.
31 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960).
32 66 Stat. 230 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1328 (1952).
33 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 538 (1960).
1 Cala. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(3) provides: "Special forms of pleadings and writs in ... quo war-
ranto . . . are hereby abolished. In the following cases relief may be obtained by appropriate action
or by an appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules:
"... (3) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any office or
franchise. The district attorney . . . may . . . bring an action against such person in the name of the
people of the state, but if the district attorney declines so to do, it may be brought upon the rela-
tion and complaint of any person . . . . When such an action is brought against a defendant alleged
to usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or, military, or any
franchise it shall be given precedence over other civil actions .... "
2 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Relief in Equity and At Law § 1765 (1893).
3 People ex rel. v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111,260 P.2d 592 (1953).
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the public appears.4 When only a private interest reveals itself, the
action cannot be entertained. 5 The code section adopted by the
Colorado Legislature was interpreted at an early date as providing
a civil action to replace the common law proceeding formerly used
in such cases.6 That code section was the source of Rule 106 (a) (3)
when the rules were adopted in 1941.
Many cases have dealt with the issue of whether a position was
a public office or employment.7 While not deciding whether quo
warranto should lie to test a private office, they do illuminate
which offices can be tested. Essentials of a public office have been
stated as an office (1) created by the constitution, legislature, or
some other body by means of authority conferred upon it by the
legislature; (2) containing a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power; (3) having duties defined by the legislature or by one
given authority to so define; (4) to be performed without control
by a body other than the legislature, unless the legislature has
created the position under the general control of a superior body;
and (5) having some permanence and continuity.8  The element
deemed to be most important in the definition of a public office is
that it must possess some portion of the sovereignty.9 Quo warranto
can cause a forfeiture of the franchise of a corporation'0 and can
also be used against an unincorporated body which is purporting to
exercise a franchise."
The Colorado Supreme Court found the action proper against
an invalid election of corporate officers on the theory that the
privileges conferred upon a private corporation are unlawfully
exercised whenever a person wrongfully undertakes to act as such
officer. 12 In England quo warranto will not lie to test the right to
a corporate office since the sovereign neither aids nor reserves any
control over it.' 3 All American courts except Massachusetts allow
such action in these instances. 14
In Nebraska an action was allowed against the head of the
English department of a state normal school, but only be.ause the
4 People ek ret. Weisbrod v. Lockhard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 Pac. 273 (1914).
5 People ex rel. Union Pacific Ry. v. Colorado E. Ry., 8 Colo. App. 301, 46 Pac. 219 (1896).
6 Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. People ex rel. Att'y Gen., 5 Colo. 60 (1879).
7 People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636, 107 P.2d 388 (1940), where positions of
city judce and city attorney were public offices; State ex rel. Nagle v. Page, 98 Mont. 14, 37 P.2d
575 (1934), in whrh state boiler inspector was not a public officer; State ex eel. Gibson v. Fern-
andez, 40 N.M. 288, 58 P.2d 1197 (1936), where state tax attorney appointed by the state tax com-
mission was not a public officer since all dut;es had been delegated to the state tax commission;
State ex. rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 258 P.2d 982 (1953), in which director of driver's
license divis'on of the publ'c s.rvice commission was employment and not pu'ilic off:ce mainly be-
cause the statutes created public service commission but did not mention a driver's license division;
Ao'lication of Milwaukee Chapter, Izaak Walton League of America, 194 Wis. 37, 216 N.W. 493
(1927), wherein state conservation director was not n oublic officer.
8 State ex ref. Nagle v. Page, 98 Mont. 14, 37 P.2d 575 (1934).
9 State ex rel. Gibson v. Fernandez, 40 N.M. 288, 53 P.2d 1197 (1936).
10 Canon City Labor Club v. People ex rel., 21 Colo. App. 37, 121 Pac. 120 (1912), in which club
received franchise to operate as a social club but actually dispensed liquor in violation ef an or-
dinance.
11 People ex rel. Cory v. Colorado High School Activities Ass'n, 141 Colo. 382, 349 P.2d 381
(1960), wherein a type of franchise was found when, to be able to engage in interschool activities,
the school districts joined and paid public monies into this association which operated independently
of statutory authority.
12 Grant v. Elder, 64 Colo. 104, 170 Pac. 198 (1918). Here a conflict arose between two factions
of stockholders-each group claiming proxies held by the other. A dissenting opinion stated that
the majority did not take notice that other states that had allowed an action against a corporate
officer had done so because of a statutory provision, while the Colorado code could not be so In-
terpreted. Then, in Wolford v. Bankers Sec. Life Ca., 91 Colo. 532, 17 P.2d 298 (1932), Mr. Justice
Butler, while upholding the rule of Grant v. Elder, remarked that he, when presiding at the trial of
Grant v. Elder as district court judge, had been much impressed by the line of argument expressed in
that dissent, but that, nevertheless, the case had been the law for fifteen years and the court should
not then deport from it.
13 Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies § 154 (1926).
14 Ibid.
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statute had considerably extended the scope of quo warranto to test
any office. 15 The court said it would ordinarily seem to cover "any
position where authority is coupled with duty and where duty is
for a public purpose. '"16
Since quo warranto lies even against a person or corporation
claiming and exercising privileges of a public nature without legis-
lative authority, the Florida Supreme Court found it would also lie
against a nominee for public office because statutes of that state
bestowed upon the nominee certain privileges, such as the exclusive
right to a place on the ballot.
1 7
In Georgia the action has also been used successfully to test
the right of a person to exercise the political party office of state
Democratic executive committee chairman.'8 Although it was ex-
pressly found to be a private office, an analogy was drawn to pri-
vate corporate offices. So the action would also lie where the legis-
lature had imposed upon the chairman of a state committee of any
political party certain specified duties, thus giving the office a
status equivalent to the office in a private corporation. 9 However,
most courts have not extended the doctrine to this extreme.2 0
By contending in the instant case that the rule should allow
a civil action against a private officer, the relators created a case of
first impression. In comparing the political party nominee and
officer with a labor union officer, is there imposed upon the latter
any duty or privilege? In Colorado the legislature has stated that
the policy of the Labor Peace Act is to recognize interests of the
public, the employee, and the employer, and that members of labor
organizations have the right to elect officers by secret ballot.2 1 But
the supreme court has held that provisions requiring labor unions to
incorporate were unconstitutional, because rights of free speech,
press and assembly were removed.22 While the recent Landrum-
15 Eason v. Majors, 11 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923).
16 Hf. at 133.
17 State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638 (1932). The court said, at page
640, "There is noth'ng soncrosanct or mvstical about a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.
It is subiect to like canons of common sense application as the other ancient prerogative writs. The
acid trst determ'native of whether or not it will relieve against the exercise of privileges claimed
to be established as matters of publici juris by statute is found in the answer to these questions: (1)
Has the Legislature prohibited its exercise by citizens generally, ether with or without condition?
and, if it has, (2) Were the evils in-view as a reason for the prohibition of a public or private
chcracter?"
IS Morris v. Peters, 203 Go. 350, 46 S.E.2d 729 (1948). Statutes had imposed upon the chairman
of any state political party commttee the duty to consolidate and publish the results of primary in
a newspaper, see that candidates' names were on the ballot, file a c'rtificcte of the primary votes
with the secretary of state, and receive and publsh the reports of recount committees. In Ritchie v.
Barker, 216 Ga. 194, 115 S.E.2d 539 (1960), the court followed Morris and found similar statutory
duties imposed upon members of a county Democrat:c executive committee.
19 Ibid.
10 Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Comm., 40 Cal.2d 91, 251 P.2d 321 (1952); People ex rel.
Brundage v. Brady, 322 III. 576, 135 N.E. 87 (1922); Attorney Gen. v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 48
N.E. 279 (1897).
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-5-1 (1953) provides: "The public policy of the state as to employment re-
lations and collective bargaining, in the furtherance of which this article is enacted, is declared to
be as follows:
"(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: That of the public, the
employee, and the employer. These three interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It is
the policy of the state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation
and to the rights of others .....
"(4) All rights of persons to join labor organizations or unions and their rights and rivileges
as members thereof, should be recognized, safeguarded and protected. No person shall be denied
membership in a labor organization or union on account of race, color, religion, sex or by any unfair
or unjust discrimination. Arbitrary or excessive initiation fees and dues shall not be required, nor
shall excessive, unwarranted, arbitrary or oppressive fines, penalties, or forfeitures be imposed. The
members are entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers, agents or representatives of ell
financial transactions and shall have the right to elect officers, by secret ballot and to determine and
vote upon the question of str:king, not striking, and other questions of policy affecting the entire
membership."
22 AFI. v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1945).
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Griffin Act imposes obligations upon union officers for internal
affairs and states certain minimum election requirements, 23  the
Colorado statutes provide for none of these.
The Landrum-Griffin Act provides a remedy after the internal
processes of the union have been exhausted.24 The only other rem-
edy found was in a few cases where equity had entertained ques-
tions arising from labor union elections on the basis of the impor-
tant economic interest (i.e., a property right) which a member has
in the person selected to lead.
25
Since, by statute,2 6 the court cannot formulate rules of pro-
cedure in such a way as to enlarge the substantive rights of the
litigants, it is not surprising that quo warranto will not lie here
against a labor union officer as long as his organization is unincor-
porated. Cases of the political party officers and nominees are of
little aid in this situation, since they carry the flavor of a public
office. Indeed, in the South, the nominee from the Democratic party
is very likely to become the public officer.
The public has been interested in labor-management relations
for some time, but only recently has it turned to look toward the
internal labor organization. It was found that membership in a
union was really not voluntary. The union had become the bread
winner. It was also found that union democracy was sometimes
lacking, but there was no remedy except in a few cases where
equity could be shown a property right.2 7 If quo warranto will not
work, a party will have to resort to the Landrum-Griffin Act where
he may find a satisfactory answer.
Marshall Dee Biesterfeld
23 Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 § 104, 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 414
(Supp. I, 1959), requires that the secretary of each labor organization must deliver a copy of each
collective bargaining agreement to any employee requesting it; § 201, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C. § 431
(Supp. I, 1959), requires that the constitution, the bylaws, a report on several aspects of the internal
procedures, and an annual financial report be filed with the Secretary of Labor and that the same
information be available to the m-mbers; and § 401, 73 Stat. 532, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (Supp. 1, 1959),
requires an election of national officers at least every five years and local officers at least every
three years by secret ballot, It also requires no discrimination between candidates by the present
officers and includes adequate election safeguards, including the preservation of ballots for one year.
24 Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 § 420, 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 482
(Supp. I, 1959) provides:
"A member of a labor organization-(1) who has exhausted the remedies available . . . or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision . . . may file a
complaint with the Secretary . . . alleging the violation of any provision of section 481 of this
title (including violation of the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization pertaining to the
election and removal of officers) ....
"The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe
that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, ...
bring a civil action against the labor organization ....
25 Bianco v. Eisen, 190 M;sc. 609, 75 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Supp. Ct. 1944); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc.
35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-2-8 (1953) provides: . . . Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge,
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigants . "
27 Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 (1959).
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